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ABSTRACT 
In everyday life many of the decisions that we make are made on behalf of other people. A 
growing body of research suggests that we often, but not always, make different decisions on 
behalf of other people than the other person would choose. This is problematic in the 
practical sense of legally designated surrogate decision-makers who may not meet the 
substituted judgment standard. Here we review evidence from studies of surrogate decision-
making and examine the extent to which surrogate decision-making accurately predicts the 
recipient’s wishes, or if it is an incomplete or distorted application of our own decision-
making processes. We find no existing domain general model of surrogate decision-making. 
We propose a framework by which surrogate decision-making can be assessed and a novel 
domain general theory as a unifying explanatory concept for surrogate decisions. 
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Toward a Psychology of Surrogate Decision-Making  
In everyday life many of the decisions that we make are made on behalf of other people. For 
example, parents make decisions for their children and spouses make decisions for their 
partners. The majority of these decisions are relatively trivial. For example, choosing a gift or 
a meal. On other occasions, such as end-of life care, these surrogate decisions are profound 
and potentially life changing. This raises the immediate question of whether decisions we 
make for other people are different from decisions we make for ourselves.  
Ageing populations in western industrialized countries have increased old-age 
dependency rates and consequently the number of surrogate decision makers has risen (Age-
UK, 2015; Ortman, Velkoff, & Hofgan, 2014). For this reason, recent research has focused 
on the accuracy of surrogate decision-making with respect to older adults and carers of 
people who are unable to make informed decisions for themselves. This paints a picture of 
surrogates often making decisions that are contrary to the recipient’s1 wishes, and often also 
different from the decision the surrogates would have made for themselves (Shalowitz, 
Garrett-Mayer, & Wendler, 2006). Investigations in other domains of decision making, 
including human mate choice (Apostolou, 2013; Buunk, Pollet, & Dubbs, 2012; Perilloux, 
Fleischman, & Buss, 2011); purchasing presents or vacations (Jonas & Frey, 2003; Jonas, 
Schultz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005; Tunney & Ziegler, 2015); standard gambles (Fernandez-Duque 
& Wifall, 2007; Ziegler & Tunney, 2015); decision-making by general practitioners (Garcia-
Retamero & Galesic, 2012); and end of life care (Fagerlin, Ditto, Danks, Houts, & Smucker, 
2001; Shalowitz et al., 2006), paint a pattern of decision making which is sometimes 
described as accurate (reflecting the choice the recipient would have made), better (different 
by way of approaching an optimum benchmark), or the same (in that the choices for self and 
recipient did not differ). Given the disparity of the results and the lack of overlap between 
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domains studied, no unified account of surrogate decision-making has yet been proposed. 
This is a significant gap in the psychological literature that we believe can be bridged with 
the model that we describe here.  
We do not propose that people possess any additional decision-making processes other 
than those that have already been described elsewhere (Kahneman, 2011), rather that the 
change in perspective from oneself to another person affects the decisions that we make on 
behalf of other people. By conceptualizing decisions for others as categorically different from 
decisions made for self, the pattern of results in the literature cannot be understood. But the 
pattern becomes predictable once we assume that decisions for self and others are influenced 
by a number of factors of which some are internal to the decision-maker and some are 
contextual. The nature of the decision and the distance between the decision maker and the 
one the decision is made for are the overarching factors influencing the decision. From the 
existing empirical literature we have identified intent, significance, accountability, 
calibration, and empathy as factors that feed into and bias the process. We present evidence 
for their influence and quantify their role in our model of decision-making in the remainder 
of this paper.  
Perspective of the decision-maker 
Surrogate decisions fall into four main categories with respect to the difference in 
intention and ability to model the recipient’s wishes, and with what the surrogate decision-
maker believes the main outcome to be. A useful framework with which to assess the 
accuracy of surrogate decision-making is therefore with respect to the perspective of the 
decision-maker. These perspectives are outlined below. 
Egocentric. The putative surrogate may simply fail to model the recipient’s wishes and 
instead make a decision on their behalf that maximizes their own, rather than the recipient’s 
outcome. This could occur because the decision-maker is essentially selfish, ill-willed, or 
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unable to adopt the perspective of another person. Whatever the reason or motive, the 
egocentric surrogate decision-maker is an oxymoron. Any agreement between the recipient’s 
wishes and their supposed surrogate occurs by accident rather than by design. 
Simulated. The decision-maker attempts to model the goals and desires of the recipient. 
This is the basis of the substituted judgment standard in medical decision-making, and the 
legal expectation in the US (Stanley, 1989). It is assumed in this normative model that next of 
kin can set aside their own preferences and make decisions that accurately reflect the wishes 
of the recipient. The accuracy of the surrogate’s decision is the extent to which it matches 
that of the recipient. This kind of surrogate decision-making is the one that we might 
optimistically hope is the most common. One aim of our model is to explain why, when a 
surrogate intends to make a fully substituted judgment (the decision that the recipient would 
have made if they were capable), they may fail to accurately simulate the recipient’s wishes.  
Projected. The decision-maker decides what they would do, or prefer, if they were in 
that situation and chooses accordingly. The surrogate’s intentions are good (with respect to 
the normative expectation) but the judgment is based on the decision-maker’s own utility 
functions or goals, and the decision-maker assumes that the recipient’s utility function or 
goals are similar. The decision-maker is cognitively capable of a first order simulation of 
what they would prefer in a hypothetical scenario, but fails to construct a second order 
simulation of what another person might do. As is the case with simulation the accuracy of 
the projected surrogate decision is the extent to which it matches that of the recipient. 
Benevolent. The decision-maker decides what they think is best for the recipient 
irrespective of the recipients actual or simulated goals or desires. The judgment is based on 
an appraisal of the utility of the outcomes, not necessarily the surrogates’ own, but on the 
basis of their perspective of the situation. Since the decision is not intended to match the 
recipient’s wishes, any match is incidental. Thus, a benevolent decision can be errorful in 
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terms of intent, but not outcome (i.e. the decision-maker co-incidentally makes a choice that 
the recipient would like); or errorful in both intent and outcome (i.e. the decision-maker 
chooses an option that the recipient would not choose themselves). This sort of decision-
making may well be common in parents, politicians and selfish partners, but it is in the case 
of medical decisions that ethical issues arise with respect to informed consent, end of life care 
and so on. Note, that a strictly benevolent decision that contradicts another person’s wishes, 
is unlikely ever to be desirable (Dixon & Smalley, 1981; Jones, 1994); and although the Best 
Interest Standard adopted in the UK ("Mental Capacity Act," 2005) requires benevolent 
decisions when the patient’s wishes are unknown, this still requires some consideration of the 
recipient’s values and stated wishes.  
We have outlined four perspectives that a surrogate decision-maker might adopt in 
making a decision on behalf of another person and that are essential as a framework on which 
to build a theory of surrogate decision-making. How then does a decision-maker decide what 
the appropriate response is when making a surrogate decision? The model of surrogate 
decision-making that we propose has two components: Perspective Taking, and a simple 
Choice Rule (see Figure 1).  
A Model of Surrogate Decision-Making 
Taking perspectives 
From subjective experience it seems reasonable to assume that in making a decision on 
behalf of another person a decision maker would ask, what would I do in that situation, what 
do I think is best for the other person, and what would the other person want. If the decision-
maker fails to do so and, instead, computes his or her own egocentric preference for the 
outcome, either because of a failure of empathy or by selfish intent, then the decision-maker 
fails to be a surrogate. In the model that we propose, the surrogate decision-maker facing a 
significant decision intends to simultaneously construct all four perspectives in the 
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computation of the relative merits of each outcome in order to act as surrogate. That is the 
decision-maker examines the choice in terms of what they would do if they were in the other 
person’s position (projection) and what they believe the other person would choose to do 
(simulation) and what the other person should do (benevolent), and what is the best outcome 
for them (egocentric). The surrogate’s ability to adopt another person’s perspective is 
assumed to be determined by their ability to engage in the perspective-taking component of 
empathy (Davis, 1983), or to construct a second order mental model of another person. So, in 
situations in which the surrogate and the recipient have different goals and values that are 
likely to affect the choice that is made, the surrogate’s ability to detach from their own 
preference will be determined by their empathetic perspective taking ability. Although it is 
unlikely that a decision-maker would admit to making a wholly egocentric surrogate decision 
it seems likely that this perspective will nonetheless have some influence on the decision that 
is eventually made. However, we also think that it is inevitable that a surrogate decision-
maker will construct a projected and a benevolent mental model even when, as in the case of 
end of life care, instructed to only construct a simulated decision. In light of this how does the 
decision maker decide which perspective is the best? 
Choosing between perspectives 
Choice Rule. Once the surrogate decision-maker has constructed the four perspectives 
and attempted to compute the relevant expected outcomes a final choice must be made. In 
situations in which the simulated and projected preference is the same as the benevolent 
option then the outcome is essentially rational. However, the model requires a choice rule in 
the likely scenario that the perspectives produce different preferences. We propose a simple 
weighted linear choice rule in which the decision-maker selects the majority option from the 
four perspectives that have been modelled. The voting weight for each perspective is 
weighted according to both internal and external factors; namely intent, significance, 
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accountability, calibration, and empathy. These biasing factors determine the importance 
given to each voting perspective. For example, if the surrogate intends to make a totally 
egocentric decision then that perspective has a voting weight of 1, and the remaining 
perspectives are either not computed or, if they are computed then they are ignored. Either 
way the result is that the remaining voting weights are set to zero. Similarly, if the surrogate 
intends to make a benevolent decision then that voting weight will be set higher than the 
simulated perspective. In this way the benevolent decision maker can ignore the wishes of the 
recipient of the decision in cases where the two perspectives disagree. We suspect that this 
arrangement of voting weights is common in naïve parents.  
As in any form of decision making the significance of the outcome is likely to affect the 
computation of alternative perspectives. Standard laboratory gambles often appear to be 
suboptimal, perhaps because they tend to be made by heuristics, when the financial outcomes 
are hypothetical, compared to when they are larger and the effort of engaging in analytic 
processing is worthwhile (Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002; Tunney & Shanks, 2002). 
Similarly, the surrogate decision maker is more likely to go to the effort of computing and 
considering all possible perspectives for profound decisions such as their parent’s end of life 
care than they are choosing dinner for their children.  
In general, people may be less likely to be asked to justify trivial decisions than they 
are to account for profound ones. Accountability might take the form of the expectation that 
we will have to verbally justify our decisions either to the recipient themselves or a legal 
context such as a tribunal or an inquest. Decisions that we expect to be held accountable for 
are more likely to involve the computation of all possible perspectives and appropriately 
weighted votes. For example, a next-of-kin end of life decision is expected to be a fully 
simulated surrogate decision. In which case the decision-maker should be able to state that all 
possible perspective were considered and that the patient’s simulated perspective was given 
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the greatest weight. On the other hand, one might expect that a parent making either a trivial 
(e.g. dinner) or profound (e.g. blood transfusion) decision on their child’s behalf would give a 
greater weight to the benevolent perspective and in many cases underweight their own 
egocentric preferences or the simulation of their child’s preferences.  
Surrogate decision makers are more likely to know or be able to predict decisions for 
people with whom they are familiar compared to those who they are less familiar (Tunney & 
Ziegler, 2015; Ziegler & Tunney, 2012). Our model incorporates the notion of calibration, to 
capture the construal or psychological distance of the surrogate and recipient (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010), and is a measure of how accurate the surrogate decision-maker believes 
their simulated decision to be. A surrogate is likely to believe that they are not likely to be 
accurate (i.e. well-calibrated) in their predictions of the wishes of a recipient or situation that 
is remote in construal distance compared to someone with whom they are more familiar. 
Thus, perceived calibration affects the weighting that the surrogate places on their simulated 
judgment. Surrogates making decisions for recipients who are far in construal distance may 
place less voting weight on that perspective than on a projected perspective. For this reason, 
decisions made on behalf of strangers may be more optimal than those made for people with 
whom we are more familiar such as our relatives (Tunney & Ziegler, 2015; Ziegler & 
Tunney, 2012). On the other hand, a surrogate may place a greater voting weight on a 
simulated perspective than a projected or benevolent perspective for recipients who they 
perceive themselves to be well-calibrated.  
Summary 
Decisions for others are often assessed as a function of how close they are to the stated 
wishes of the surrogate. This often paints a bleak picture of differences in decision-making. 
However, surrogate decision-makers may not have as their goal to match the wishes of the 
recipient, but instead try to make what they perceive to be an optimal or benevolent decision. 
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The model of surrogate decision-making that we propose has at its core the notion that, in 
attempting to make decisions on behalf of other people, the decision maker simulates their 
own preferences and their perceived preferences of the other person.  
We present a framework by which we can assess the intention and accuracy of a 
surrogate decision-maker in the existing literature and that we hope will frame future 
research. In particular, research should consider the extent to which a surrogate decision may 
be a projection of our own wishes, a benevolent recommendation, or a true simulation of 
another person’s mind. The model that we present captures the cognitive component of 
empathy (perspective taking) that provides a normative benchmark for the accuracy of a 
surrogate decision-maker. Our model also describes how an individual decision-maker’s 
ability to simulate another person’s decision making processes and anticipate their wishes is 
likely to be distorted according to internal factors such as their emotional ability to empathise 
with another person, and external factors such as the psychological distance between the two 
people. In situations in which these perspectives disagree we propose a simple choice rule 
that predicts situations in which a surrogate decision maker might accurately reflect the 
recipient’s wishes, and situations in which they may fail to do so. To our knowledge, there 
exists no other domain general model of the psychological processes that underlie what is 
actually a common, critically important and increasingly needed human faculty. 
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FOOTNOTE 
1. We use the word ‘recipient’ to denote the person for whom the surrogate makes the 
decision. In some circumstances the word ‘ward’ or ‘legatee’ may be more appropriate. The 
word ‘beneficiary’ may not be appropriate since there are circumstances in which the 
recipient may not benefit from the decision.  
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Table 1. Factors that influence decision weights in surrogate decision-making. The decision-maker adjusts the decision-weights in order to place 
greater or less emphasis on the predicted choices of each perspective that they attempt to model. The weight for each perspective can be thought 
of as an aggregate of each biasing factor, and this in turn determines the importance given to each vote. 
 Biasing factor 
 Intent Empathy Significance Accountability Calibration 
Explanation 
of Category 
The intention of the 
decision-maker in 
choosing a perspective, 
i.e. benevolent, 
projected, egocentric, or 
simulated. 
An individual difference 
internal to the decision-
maker.  
The likely impact of the 
outcome of the decision 
that is external to the 
decision-maker. 
The likelihood that the 
surrogate will be 
required to explain and 
be held accountable for 
their decision. 
Describes the 
relationship between the 
decision-maker and 
recipient. Incorporates 
psychological and 
construal distance. 
Relevance and 
weighting 
Selfish decision-makers 
may place greater weight 
on an egocentric 
perspective, the 
benevolent decision -
maker might intend to 
make a best-interest 
judgement and weigh 
the perspective 
accordingly. 
In many circumstances 
the surrogate decision 
maker is unlikely to 
admit to adopting an 
egocentric perspective, 
but the model assumes 
that even underweighted 
perspectives will have an 
influence on the ultimate 
choice. 
More empathic people 
are likely to understand 
that other people might 
have different 
preferences than 
themselves and assign a 
greater weight to the 
simulated perspective.  
Less empathic people 
may believe that other 
people have similar 
preferences to their own 
and assign a greater 
weight to the projected 
perspective. 
Decisions with profound 
consequences are more 
likely to be weighed 
towards the required 
benchmark (substituted 
judgement or best 
interest). End of life 
decisions are more likely 
to be simulated for well-
calibrated people, and 
either projected or 
benevolent for poorly 
calibrated people.  
Decisions with trivial 
consequences are more 
likely to vary in the 
decision weights 
dependent upon the 
surrogate’s intent or 
accountability of 
decision -making.  
Decisions for which the 
surrogate is likely to be 
held accountable will 
place greater weight on 
the required perspective. 
For example a parent 
might place greater 
weight on the 
benevolent perspective 
while a life-partner 
might place greater 
weight on the simulated 
perspective. 
Decisions that are 
unlikely to require 
accountability will be 
determined by the 
intentions of the 
decision maker. 
Surrogates who are 
closer or more familiar 
with the recipient are 
likely to believe that a 
simulated perspective is 
an accurate prediction of 
the recipient’s 
preferences and give that 
perspective the greatest 
weight.  
Surrogates who are far in 
construal distance or 
unfamiliar with the 
recipient may not have 
confidence in a 
simulated perspective 
and may instead assign a 
greater decision weight 
to either a projected or a 
benevolent perspective. 
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Surrogate decision-making 
 
FIGURE CAPTION 
Figure 1: A model of surrogate decision-making in which the decision-maker simulates the 
choice outcomes and decides among them using a simple choice rule. Choice weights are 
determined by the decision-maker’s intentions and familiarity with the recipient. 
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